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CoRPORATIONs-ZoNING-&ROGATION OF PRIVATE

recent New
Jersey decision1 raises a question of current importance in view of the
acute housing shortages in many metropolitan areas. Can a municiRESTRICTIVE CoVENANTS BY ZoNING REGULATIONS-A

1 Taylor v. Hackensack, 137 N.J.L~ 139, 58 A. (2d) 788 (1948), affd. without
opinion, 62 A. (2d) 686 (1948). Petitioners were the owners of single dwellings on
the tract of land in question, their deeds containing restrictions limiting construction to
single-family units. The city of Hackensack had sold land in this tract to- one Ingannamort,
placing a restriction in the contract limiting construction to single units. At that time the
zoning ordinance also limited this land to single-family dwellings. Later the city amended
its zoning ordinance changing the land in question from a single-family to a multiple-family
zone, and a resolution was passed waiving the restrictions in the contract between the city
and Ingannamort. Petitioners sought a writ of certiorari to review a judgment sustaining
the validity of the cij:Y's action. The appellate court held that the validity of the resolution
could not be disposed of on certiorari, and that petitioners' remedy, if any, was by injunction. However, it seems clear that a substantive question was decided, since the court said,
at p. 142, "We hold that there is no such limitation on the right to zone, and that the
amendment in this case is valid ••••" ,
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pality, acting under its power to establish zoning regulations, authorize
the construction of multiple-family dwellings in a particular area and
simultaneously abrogate private covenants which restrict the area to single-family dwellings?
The power to zone, when expressly granted to a municipal corporation, is recognized as part of the police power of the municipality,
and regulations imposed thereunder will be sustained if they are
reasonable and are substantially related to the health, safety, morals and
general welfare of the community. 2 However, the courts have generally found that the zoning ordinances under consideration did not or
could not nullify private covenants that were more stringent.3 The
decision of the New Jersey court in reaching a contrary result represents a departure from the general view, and suggests that private
covenants may not afford the protection long attributed to them. 4

I
It is clear that a zoning regulation authorizing multiple dwellings
in an area covered by private covenants restricting construction to
single-family units would involve the destruction of property interests.5
Should it follow that a city, in the exercise of its police power, is pre2Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114 (1926).
a For cases holding that zoning ordinances cannot override, annul or relieve land from
building restrictions, or covenants placed thereon by deed, see Burgess v. Magarian, 214
Iowa 694, 243 N.W. 356 (1932); Vorenberg v. Bunnell, 257 Mass. 399, 153 N.E. 884
(1926); Dolan v. Brown, 338 ID. 412, 170 N.E. 425 (1930); Magnolia Petroleum Co.
v. Drauver, 183 Okla. 579, 83 P. (2d) 840 (1938); Szilvasy v. Saviers, 70 Ohio App.
34, 44 N.E. (2d) 732 (1942); Forstrnann v. Joray Holding Co., 244 N.Y. 22, 154 N.E.
- 652 (1926); Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P. (2d) 704 (1943); Ludgate
v. Somerville, 121 Ore. 643, 256 P. 1043 (1927). These courts have indicated that an
ordinance would have no effect upon the deed restrictions where the covenant prescribes
residences and the section is zoned for businesses and apartments. See 3 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY, §858 (1939); METZEN.BAUM, THE LAw OF ZoNING 282 (1930).
4 Although the New Jersey court observed in the latter part of its opinion that there
was no evidence establishing a community scheme of covenants which would prevent erection of other than single-dwelling houses, a preceding part of the opinion states, "It does
not seem to be disputed that the single-family dwellings restriction was applicable to
the lands in question." Taylor v. City of Hackensack, 137 N.J.L. 139 at 140, 58 A.
(2d) 788 (1948) affd. without opinion, 62 A. (2d) 686 (1948). Contact with one of the
attorneys for the petitioners verifies the conclusion that the petitioners were claiming relief
on the ground that the amendment was in violation of the restrictive covenants applicable
to the tract in question.
5 Ladd v. Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 24 N.E. 858 (1890); Frumveller v. Post, 167 Mich.
464, 133 N.W. 317 (1911); Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242,
117 N.E. 244 (1917); Flynn v. N.Y., Westchester & Boston Ry. Co., 218 N.Y. 140, 112
N.E. 913 (1916); Ludgate v. Somerville, 121 Ore. 643, 256 P. 1043 (1927).
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vented from enacting such a regulation -unless compensation is given
to the beneficiaries of the covenants? The courts which have held that
zoning regulations ate invalid insofar as they contravene restrictive
covenants6 would presumably feel obligated to answer this question
affirmatively. On the other hand, it seems that a court should be
reluctant to impose such a limitation on the exercise of the police power.
Zoning regulations interfering with "rights" acquired under a prior
ordinance have been invalidated, but these decisions are not compelling
authority for denying the use of the zoning power to abrogate private
covenants. A typical case holding that the zoning power could not be
used to eliminate rights acquired under a prior ordinance was Clifton
Hills Realty Co. 11. Cincinnati, 7 where the plaintiff owned land which
he had developed into a subdivision: streets had been laid, sidewalks
built and lots platted under a general zoning plan restricting use to
family residence. An amendment to a zoning regulation that would
have permitted multiple units in this district was declared unconstitutional, it appearing that the value of the plaintiff's property would have
been reduced by the introduction of multiple units. Nevertheless, the
court carefully noted the absence of evidence to show that the amendment was designed to promote the public health, safety or general
welfare.
In Wilcox 11. Pittsburgh,8 the city of Pittsburgh amended an ordinance to permit erection of apartment houses in a district that had been
zoned for single dwellings. The court held that the amendment
deprived the plaintiffs of property without due process of law. The
record indicated, however, that (1) the amendment was made against
the recommendations of the City Planning Commission, and (2) the
amendment was made without £ndings as to a change in conditions.
As to this last ground, the court said, "As conditions are the basis and
justification for zoning, clearly a change in the former is essential to
a change in the latter," 9 thus implying that the amendment might have
been upheld if the necessary change in conditions had been shown.
Many decisions in this particular field, although invalidating zoning
regulations or amendments thereto, do not expressly hold that it is
not within the power of a city to make the particular change. The
See note 3, supra.
60 Ohio App. 443, 21 N.E. (2d) 993 (1938), noted in 38 MICH. L. R.Ev. 431 (1940).
s (C.C.A. 3d, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 835.
9Jd. at 837.
6
7
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typical decision merely holds that, on the facts of the case, the regulation was unnecessary, unreasonable, or not in the public interest.
Logically, improvements made in reliance upon an existing ordinance
should be subject to removal by a later exercise of the police power if.
the public interest so requires, unless it is to be argued that the municipality divested itself of its police power by enacting the original
ordinance.
..
Similarly, the courts which have declared that zoning regulations
cannot abrogate private covenants have found that the ordinances were
not intended to apply to such covenants, were arbitrary· and unreasonable, or were against public policy. There is practically no direct
authority holding that a municipality does not have the power to affect
private covenants by _enactment of a reasonable zoning regulation.
In the leading Supreme Court decision10 holding an ordinance
regulating future uses to be a valid exercise of the police power, it was
recognized that enforcement of such ordinances might result in great
monetary loss to property owners.a When danger or discomfort might
result to the public from a particular use, its immediate elimination
has been held constitutional. Thus, the owners of brick kilns12 and
livery stables,1 3 who ·had carried on business for years in a particular
locality, have been forced to remove such businesses from the locality,
although no compensation was offered for the damage sustained. Certainly public health and welfare are equally supported by legislation
for the purpose of providing adequate housing facilities.

II
It would seem that a city's attempt to authorize the violation of
private covenants is analogous, in principle, to the attempt to eliminate
existing non-conforming uses. In the former case, a property owner is
10 Euclid

v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114 (1926).
record indicated that the realty company's land was worth about $10,000 an acre
for industrial purposes, while its value for the zoned residential use was about $2,500. See
also West Bros. Brick Co., Inc. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881 {1937), where
a brick company purcbased land because of its valuable clay deposits only to discover
the property zoned for residential buildings. There are many sucb cases, and it has been
held that the loss must be borne without compensation where there is a reasonable relationship between the purpose of the zoning regulations and the public welfare.
12 Hadacbeck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143 (1915), where the property
was reduced in value from $800,000 to $60,000.
1s Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 1'71, 35 S.Ct. 511 (1915).
- 11 The
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told that the present restrictions, m reliance on which investment has
been made, are to be governed by the zoning regulation, and, if the regulation conllicts with the private covenants, the regulation is to prevail. In
the case of the non-conforming use, the property owner is likewise told
that the present use to which the land is being put is to be limited by
the regulation. The Louisiana court:1 4 has held that a zoning ordinance
may compel the discontinuance of a non-conforming use. This decision
appears to stand alone;15 yet it seems sound. The court apparently
thought that if a village had authority under police power to zone, it
was necessarily authorized to carry out the scheme by ordering removal
of the non-conforming use. Other cases have simply assumed, without
much discussion, that zoning is a power that can only be used to affect
future uses, and that any attempt to eliminate existing uses would be
an unconstitutional taking of property.16 However, attention is being
given to the possibility of eliminating non-conforming uses by amortization methods. 17
It is recognized that most courts have shown no inclination to
uphold any plan calling for elimination of existing uses, except insofar
as the use may constitute a nuisance which would be subject to abatement. Yet, if the public health, safety, morals or general welfare
requires the adoption of such a scheme, courts should be willing to
uphold the plans. The difference between an ordinance restricting
future uses, and an ordinance requiring the elimination of existing
uses, is merely one of degree, and the constitutionality in either case
should depend upon the relationship between public gain and private
loss. Although the value of a restrictive covenant cannot be accurately
compared with the value of the right to continue a non-conforming
use, it would seem that in the typical case the damage caused by
elimination of the beneficial interest under a restrictive covenant by a
zoning regulation might· be less than the damage suffered by one
compelled to discontinue a non-conforming use.
14 State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 S. 613, cert. den.,
280 U.S. 556, 50 S.Ct. 16 (1929). An amortization period (the time allowed for meeting
the requirements of the ordinance) of one year was permitted by the ordinance involved
in that case.
_
15 By the weight of authority, a zoning ordinance may not operate to suppress or remove from a resid~tial district an otherwise lawful business already established therein.
See 86 A.L.R. 688 (1933); Jones v. Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930).
16 See, e.g., Jones v. Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930).
11 9 Umv. Cm. L. RBv. 477 (1942).
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The cases suggesting that a non-conforming use cannot be removed
are not recent decisions: 18 . many of the assertions that elimination of
an existing use would be unconstitutional were dicta which could
gradually be repudiated.19 Since the scope of-police power is not
merely negative, ordinances· which . constructively and affirmatively
undertake to promote public interests should be upheld. 20

III
1

The Wisconsin court:2 has observed that rights granted by legislative action under the police power can be taken away when, in the
valid exercise of its discretion, the legislative body sees fit. 22 The
Wisconsin case involved a zoning amendment by the city of Sheboy~
gan converting a one-family area into an apartment zone. The evidence
indicated that the re-zoned tract was unsuitable for building singlefamily residences because of the soil condition.23 Although the plaintiffs claimed to have purchased or built in reliance on the single-family
classification, the court held that they were not entitled to compensation.24 If the police power can be used to authorize construction of
apartments in an area not suited for building one-family units because
of peculiar soil conditions~ should it not also be available for eliminating
private building restrictions in an area, when the pµblic interest requires multiple dwellings? There is violation of a "property right" in
both cases; the degree of the violation is not necessarily greater in the
latter case.
-

IV
What was at one time regarded as an improper ·exercise of the
police power may now, because of changed living conditions, be recog-.
nized as a legitimate exercise of that power. 25 A recent federal case26
/

18 See note 14, supra.
19" ••• The inalienable

rights of the individual are· not what they used to be." West
Bros.. Brick Co., Inc. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271 at 283, 192 S.E. 881 (1937).
20 Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925).
21Eggebeen v. Sonnenberg, 239 Wis. 213, LN.W. (2d) 84 (1941).
22 Id. at 218. The court cited BAssBTI', ZoNING 32, 108, 178 (1936); Piper v. Ekern,
180 Wis. 586, 194 N.W. 159 (1923).
23 There were unusual difficulties in establishing firm foundations; it was economically
sound to build apartment houses, but not to erect one-family homes.
24 Citing State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451 (1923).
25 Miller v. "Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925), citing Streich
v. Board of Education, 34 S.D. 169, 147 N.W. 799 (1914); L.R.A. 1915A, 632; Ann.
Cas. (1917A) 760. In the Streich case, it was also observed at 175-176: ''There is nothing
known to the law that keeps more in step with human progress than does the exercise of
this power."
2swolpe v. Poretsky, (App. D.C. 1946) 154 F. (2d) 330.
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gave tacit recognition to this doctrine when the court stated that in
view of the housing shortage the action of the zoning commission in
refusing a permit to build an apartment house had a negative relation
to the public welfare. The court observed that the defendant's proposed
apartment building would accommodate many more people than the
single dwellings which might be built on the lot.
If it appears clearly that the objective of a regulation authorizing
apartments in an area subject to private covenants is to provide vital
additional housing, a court should have valid grounds for holding that,
because of changed conditions, this is a proper exercise of the police
power, and that the "property interests" of the beneficiaries of the
covenants could thus be taken without compensation. 27 If there was
evidence upon which the city authorities ,could have found that the
ordinance was necessary in consideration of the public health, safety,
comfort or general welfare, it is beyond the province of the court to
say that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or confiscatory, even though it
may depreciate in value business _property or restrict the liberty -of
citizens in regard to ownership and use of property.28 The decision in
the principal case may foreshadow a significant change in the thinking
of the courts upon the question of the sanctity of private covenants
that interfere with the satisfactory growth of cities.
Robert Dilts
27 "Regulations may result to some extent, practically in the taking of property, . . •
and yet not be deemed confiscatory or unreasonable." State v. Hillman, 110 Conn. 92 at
105, 147 A. 294 (1929).
2s Cassel Realty Co. v. Omaha, 144 Neb. 753, 14 N.W. (2d) 600 (1944), citing
Pettis v. Alpha Alpha Chapter of Phi Beta Pi, 115 Neb. 525, 213 N.W. 835 (1927).
A court will not ordinarily substitute its judgment for the decision of a mU11icipal council
or board of zoning appeals. Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381
(1925); BASSE'IT, ZONING 122 (1936).

